TechnologyGuide

Passkeys, Explained: How They Work and Where They Still Fall Short

A passkey swaps a secret you type for a key pair your device keeps. Here is how that resists phishing, what happens when you lose a phone, and where passkeys still fall short.

A glowing fingerprint on a dark circular scanner surface.
Photo: George Prentzas / Unsplash
Illustrative photo of a fingerprint scanner; not a specific product.Photo: George Prentzas / Unsplash
In This Article
  1. A key pair, not a stored secret
  2. Why passkeys resist phishing
  3. Synced and device-bound passkeys
  4. What happens when you lose your phone
  5. Where passkeys still fall short
  6. Where passkeys stand now

Passkeys let you sign in by unlocking your phone or laptop instead of typing a password. The idea is simple, but the details matter: how the cryptography resists fake sites, how syncing changes the security trade-off, and why the other ways into an account still count.

NIST treats phishing as getting a sign-in secret or a valid sign-in response handed to an impostor posing as the real site. With a passkey, the FIDO Alliance says, there are no passwords to steal. The technology is built on a World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) standard, and NIST's federal authentication guidelines set rules for syncable authenticators, its term for authenticators whose keys are copied through a cloud sync service.

A key pair, not a stored secret

A password is a shared secret: you know it, and the website stores a version of it. The FIDO Alliance notes that passwords have long been exposed to phishing and credential-stuffing attacks because of password reuse and database breaches.

A passkey works differently. FIDO describes passkeys as replacing passwords with cryptographic key pairs kept on devices such as phones, computers, and security keys. When you create a passkey, only the public key goes to the site. The W3C's Web Authentication specification, the browser standard that passkeys rely on, says the credential public key is returned to the relying party, its term for the party that runs the website or app, during registration.

Microsoft's support page describes the sign-in step: the private key is stored on your device, and after you unlock it, your device digitally signs a challenge from the website, and the website verifies the signature using the public key. The private key is never sent to the website. The W3C specification says the private key is expected never to be exposed to any other party, not even to the owner of the authenticator.

Apple frames the server-side benefit in its developer documentation: because servers keep only public keys, they are less valuable targets for hackers. The FIDO Alliance says that with passkeys there is "no sign-in data that can be used to perpetuate attacks."

Why passkeys resist phishing

Passkeys are tied to the website or app that created them. The W3C specification says a credential can only be accessed by origins belonging to the relying party that registered it, and that this scoping is enforced jointly by the browser and the authenticator. Microsoft says that even if you land on a similar-looking site, your device will not present the passkey to it. A passkey made for your bank will not answer a look-alike domain, no matter how convincing the page looks.

NIST calls this phishing resistance. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology defines it in Special Publication 800-63B-4, finalized in July 2025, as a property of the sign-in protocol: secrets and valid sign-in responses cannot be handed to an impostor posing as the real site, and the protection does not depend on the user spotting the fake. Of the two methods NIST accepts, channel binding and verifier name binding, it names Web Authentication as an example of the second, in which the authenticator's secret is chosen based on the site's authenticated domain name.

A passkey made for your bank will not answer a look-alike domain, no matter how convincing the page looks.

NIST sets three authentication assurance levels, AAL1 to AAL3. Its guidelines require services at the middle level, AAL2, to offer at least one phishing-resistant option, and they require federal agencies to have their staff, contractors, and partners use phishing-resistant authentication to access federal information systems. Codes typed in by hand, such as one-time codes, do not qualify: NIST says manual entry does not tie the code to the session being signed in, so an impostor could relay it to the real site.

Synced and device-bound passkeys

Microsoft describes synced passkeys as saved in a credential manager or cloud service and synchronized between your devices, and device-bound passkeys as stored only on the device where they were created. FIDO says device-bound passkeys in modern hardware security keys offer the highest security assurance.

Each platform handles syncing through its own credential manager. Apple says passkeys sync through iCloud Keychain, where they are end-to-end encrypted so that even Apple cannot read them. Microsoft says passkeys saved to a synced credential manager sync through your cloud account, and that you can use Microsoft Password Manager or a third-party provider. Google says Android devices signed in to a Google Account may have passkeys registered automatically.

Syncing has a cost in NIST's framework. NIST allows syncable authenticators up to AAL2 but says they shall not be used at AAL3, its highest level, because syncing requires the private key to be exportable. NIST also sets conditions for the sync service: keys stored there must be encrypted, signing must still happen on the local device, and access to the synced keys must itself be protected by multi-factor authentication equivalent to AAL2.

Signing in on another computer

A passkey on your phone can also sign you in on a nearby computer that does not hold it. Microsoft says the device where you want to sign in generates a QR code, and a proximity check makes sure the device holding the passkey is nearby. Google's instructions for the same flow tell users to turn on Bluetooth and scan the QR code with the phone.

What happens when you lose your phone

For synced passkeys, losing one device does not mean losing the passkey. The FIDO Alliance says a passkey created on one device is synced to the user's other devices that use the same passkey provider and are signed in to the same account.

For device-bound passkeys, the loss is real. Microsoft says that if you lose the device, you lose the passkey unless you have another recovery method.

Google cautions that anyone who can unlock your device can access your Google Account through its passkey, and it advises creating passkeys only on devices you personally own and use. If a device is lost or stolen, Google says you can remove its passkey from your account.

Where passkeys still fall short

Resisting phishing does not settle everything.

Account recovery

A passkey does not replace the way back into an account after you lose access. Google says adding a passkey to a Google Account does not change or remove any authentication or recovery factors already on the account, and that you can still choose to sign in with your password. NIST treats account recovery as a separate process that is expected to be used rarely and is generally less convenient than signing in. It recognizes four classes of recovery method: saved recovery codes, issued recovery codes, recovery contacts, and repeating identity proofing. To reduce the need for recovery, NIST says services should encourage people to keep at least two separate means of authentication.

Moving between ecosystems

Synced passkeys are stored with a passkey provider. The FIDO Alliance says that can be the credential manager built into a browser or operating system, such as iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager, or a third-party app such as 1Password or Dashlane. Moving between providers is the gap FIDO set out to close: when it published working drafts, not yet intended for implementation, of a Credential Exchange Protocol and Credential Exchange Format in October 2024, it said there had been no standard for the secure movement of credentials. The drafts aim to let people move passwords, passkeys, and other credentials to another provider without sending them in the clear. The format specification reached Proposed Standard status on August 14, 2025, according to the FIDO Alliance's specifications site. Apple's developer page now says users can securely import and export passkeys between password managers.

Shared accounts

Sharing depends on the provider. Google says its passkeys cannot be shared. Apple says people can create groups to share passwords and passkeys. NIST notes that some syncable authenticator implementations support sharing keys between different users, and warns that public-facing services lack the device-management controls organizations can use on enterprise accounts to limit it.

Where passkeys stand now

None of this means the password has disappeared; Google, as noted above, still lets you use one. The W3C published Web Authentication Level 3 as a full Recommendation on August 25, 2026. NIST's final guidelines expect phishing-resistant options at AAL2 and set rules for syncable authenticators, NIST's term for authenticators whose keys are synced through a cloud service. Apple and Microsoft document passkey syncing, and Apple, Google, and Microsoft each mention cross-device sign-in.

On use, the FIDO Alliance reports that in a 2024 independent survey it commissioned, 53% of people said they had enabled passkeys on at least one of their accounts, and 22% on every account they could. Those are self-reported answers.

Sources

  1. FIDO Passkeys: Passwordless AuthenticationFIDO AlliancePrimary source
  2. Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials, Level 3 (W3C Recommendation, 25 August 2026)World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), August 25, 2026Primary source
  3. NIST Special Publication 800-63BNational Institute of Standards and Technology, July 31, 2025Primary source
  4. SP 800-63B-4, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator ManagementNIST Computer Security Resource Center, July 31, 2025Primary source
  5. Passkeys OverviewApple DeveloperPrimary source
  6. Sign in with a passkey instead of a passwordGoogle Account HelpPrimary source
  7. What are passkeys and why they matterMicrosoft SupportPrimary source
  8. FIDO Alliance Publishes New Specifications to Promote User Choice and Enhanced UX for PasskeysFIDO Alliance, October 14, 2024Primary source
  9. Credential Exchange Format, Version 1.0 (Proposed Standard, August 14, 2025)FIDO Alliance, August 14, 2025Primary source

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