Since 2022, governments have offered tens of billions of dollars to bring semiconductor manufacturing onshore. Some factories are now running. Others have slipped by years or been shelved. Companies and agencies cite several reasons, including the timing of federal funding, skilled labor, customer demand, and environmental review.
In April 2022, construction began on a chip factory in Kumamoto, Japan. By December 2024 it was in volume production, according to the annual report its majority owner, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, filed with US regulators. In Phoenix, Arizona, TSMC had set up a US subsidiary in November 2020 to build a plant of its own. That first Arizona facility entered high-volume production at the end of 2024, the company says.
Both factories now run, and both received government support: TSMC's annual report says its subsidiaries in the United States, Germany, Japan, and China received subsidies from those countries' governments. The two timelines, under three years in one case and about four in the other, are measured from different starting points: groundbreaking in Kumamoto, incorporation in Arizona.
Why governments started paying
Semiconductors are the components that let electronic devices compute and store data. The global chip shortage during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted their importance to the economy, as the European Court of Auditors put it, and production of the most advanced chips was concentrated in very few places: in 2022, according to a May 2024 report by the Semiconductor Industry Association, a US industry group, and Boston Consulting Group, advanced logic capacity sat almost entirely in South Korea and Taiwan.
In the United States, the CHIPS Act of 2022, part of a law signed on August 9, 2022, created a fund that included $39 billion over five fiscal years, 2022 through 2026, for incentives to build and expand chip manufacturing. The same law created a 25% investment tax credit for advanced manufacturing facilities. The Congressional Research Service reported in July 2026 that the credit now stands at 35% and is available only to projects that begin construction before December 31, 2026.
The European Commission introduced its own Chips Act in February 2022, according to the Court of Auditors. Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 entered into force on September 21, 2023, organized around three pillars: a research and pilot-line initiative, measures for security of supply, and a system for monitoring and crisis response. The Commission says it has approved 21 state-aid decisions for what it calls first-of-a-kind semiconductor facilities, representing over €33 billion in public and private investment. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, India, and mainland China launched or expanded programs of their own, according to the SIA and BCG report.
The projections
The ambition is visible in the forecasts. The SIA and BCG report estimated around $2.3 trillion in private investment in wafer fabrication worldwide between 2024 and 2032, compared with $720 billion in the decade before the CHIPS Act. It projected that US manufacturing capacity would grow 203% between 2022 and 2032, raising the country's share of global capacity from 10% to 14%. Without the policy push, the report said, that share would have slipped to 8%. Those are industry projections, not measurements, and they were made before many of the schedule changes described below.
The same report noted that bringing wafer fabs online involves substantial lead time, upwards of five years in some cases.
What a fab needs
A chip factory is known as a fab. TSMC alone had annual capacity equivalent to more than 17 million 12-inch wafers in 2025, according to its annual report.
TSMC's annual report lists disruptions to water, electricity, and natural gas among the risks that could interrupt its operations, and names scarce industrial land and access to utilities as limits on future expansion. The European Court of Auditors, reviewing Europe's strategy in 2025, pointed to high energy costs, dependence on imported raw materials, environmental concerns, and a shortage of skilled workers as factors affecting the bloc's competitiveness. CRS notes that many US-funded projects have drawn scrutiny from environmental regulators and local residents because of the scale of construction, the intensity of resource use in chipmaking, and other concerns.
Then there are people. The SIA has projected that 67,000 positions, or 58% of new jobs created in US semiconductor manufacturing and design between 2023 and 2030, would go unfilled, according to the CRS report. Construction is its own constraint: CRS cites analysts who suggest a shortage of workers experienced in building advanced facilities partly explains why fabs take longer to build in the United States than in Taiwan.
A fab also needs customers. TSMC makes chips from designs its customers provide, as its annual report explains, and the report warns that if market demand does not materialize, the costs of its capacity expansions could hurt its financial performance. Customer demand is one of four factors CRS identifies as shaping project schedules.
Awarded, then paid out in stages
Commerce announced its first preliminary award terms under the CHIPS Act in December 2023 and its first final award in September 2024, according to CRS, which reports that some companies amended their schedules when awards did not arrive within their expected timeline. By January 2025, the US Commerce Department had awarded 19 semiconductor companies up to $30.7 billion in direct funding and $5.5 billion in loans for 40 fab projects, according to CRS. Another 12 companies had signed preliminary agreements for 18 projects; as of June 2026, CRS found no public record that they had received final awards.
As of April 2026, Commerce had paid out about 42% of its direct funding awards. The Government Accountability Office, reporting in August 2026, put the figure at $13.1 billion of $31.2 billion. GAO says awardees are paid for completing project milestones, carrying out workforce activities, and conducting design activities, while Intel was paid under the terms of an amended agreement that removed its milestones. GAO found that the milestones completed so far had met their contractual due dates, while nine others were past their anticipated completion dates.
As of April 2026, Commerce had paid out about 42% of its direct funding awards.
Schedules that moved
Company schedules moved in both directions. CRS groups the reasons that more than one company cited into four categories: uncertainty about when federal funding would arrive, shortages of skilled labor, customer demand, and environmental review.
In July 2023, according to CRS, TSMC moved its target for starting mass production at its first Phoenix fab from 2024 to 2025, citing a shortage of skilled workers with the expertise to install equipment in a semiconductor-grade facility. TSMC's annual report says that facility entered high-volume production at the end of 2024. Other projects ran long. Micron said in November 2025 that its first planned fab in Clay, New York, would open in the third quarter of 2030 rather than 2028. The county government, which oversaw permitting and supported infrastructure improvements for the project, attributed the delay to labor and supply-chain shortages, according to CRS. The same project's plan to fill more than 200 acres of wetlands also required environmental review.
Demand shaped others. Intel announced in February 2025 that its planned fab in New Albany, Ohio, would open in 2030 rather than 2026, citing the needs of its business and broader market demand, CRS reports. In its annual report filed in January 2026, Intel said it had slowed the pace of construction in Ohio and discontinued planned expansions in Germany, a fab, and in Poland, an assembly and test site. The company also said that if it cannot secure a significant external customer for its next leading-edge process, Intel 14A, it may pause or discontinue that effort. In one case schedules moved earlier: CRS notes media reports in December 2025 that TSMC had moved the start of mass production at its second Phoenix fab from 2028 to 2027, which a company executive attributed to AI-related demand from customers.
The deals keep changing
The policy itself has not stood still. In March 2025, CRS notes, President Trump said he intended to renegotiate award agreements. GAO found that Commerce amended existing awards for 14 companies between January 2025 and April 2026. By April 2026, after Commerce made new awards, GAO reported direct funding awards of $31.2 billion; CRS had counted up to $30.7 billion in January 2025.
One change involved Intel. In August 2025, according to GAO, Commerce amended Intel's award so that the government received 9.9% of the company's outstanding shares. GAO says Intel's six funded projects were deemed complete once it had spent $7.865 billion, the full amount of its awards, on eligible costs, and the original milestones were removed. GAO reports that Intel had received disbursements of that amount by April 2026. GAO also reports that for new awards, Commerce now considers how much equity a company agrees to provide, which it did not do for earlier awards. Micron and TSMC, by contrast, announced plans to increase the capital spending on their funded projects, CRS says, and Micron's award grew by $275 million.
Two dates now hang over the US program. CRS points out that fiscal 2026 is the last year for which the CHIPS Act provides incentive funding, and that the 35% tax credit applies only to fabs that start construction before December 31, 2026. Whether Congress extends support is an open question.
Europe's target
The EU set itself a goal: a 20% share of global production value in cutting-edge and sustainable chips by 2030, part of its Digital Decade strategy. In April 2025 the European Court of Auditors, the EU's independent auditor, concluded that the target appears out of reach.
Among the auditors' reasons is funding scale. The Commission is responsible for only 5%, or €4.5 billion, of an estimated €86 billion in Chips Act funding through 2030; the rest is expected from member states and industry. By comparison, the auditors noted, the top global chipmakers budgeted €405 billion in investment over the three years from 2020 to 2023. The auditors also found that the Commission has no mandate to coordinate national investments at EU level to ensure they align with the Act's objectives, and that the Act lacks clarity in its targets and monitoring. The Commission's own July 2024 forecast, cited by the auditors, predicted the EU's share of the global value chain would rise only from 9.8% in 2022 to 11.7% by 2030.
"The 20 % target was essentially aspirational – meeting it would require us to approximately quadruple our production capacity by 2030, but we are nowhere close to that with our current rate of progress," said Annemie Turtelboom, the Court of Auditors member who led the audit.
The auditors also flagged a structural risk: Europe's chip industry is concentrated in a few large companies and projects, so the cancellation or delay of a single project can affect the whole sector. Intel's decision to drop its planned German fab, disclosed in its annual report, is one such case. Other projects are going ahead. ESMC, TSMC's European joint venture with Bosch, Infineon, and NXP, began construction in Dresden in 2024, according to TSMC, and in December 2024 agreed with Germany to receive up to €5 billion in state aid under the Chips Act.
The Commission says the Chips Act has helped mobilize more than €80 billion in announced or planned investment, and in June 2026 it proposed a revised law it calls the Chips Act 2.0. As of November 2026 the Commission's page describes it as a proposal, not adopted law.
Why it takes years
In Magupon's reading, the slow pace looks less like a single failure than like the sum of many requirements described above. A fab must be sited where water, power, and land are available; permitted; built by specialized crews; filled with specialized tools; staffed by engineers and technicians who may not yet have been trained; and matched with customers whose orders justify running it. Some of those steps can be shortened. CRS notes that a later law, the Building Chips in America Act, exempted certain CHIPS-funded activities from federal environmental and historic-preservation reviews, which it says may accelerate construction, though other reviews can still apply, as Micron's wetlands permit shows.
In Kumamoto, TSMC's annual report notes, Sony, DENSO, and later Toyota took stakes in the Japanese venture, and construction of a second site began in October 2025. In Ohio, Intel's annual report says that, having reassessed demand and its "shell ahead" strategy of establishing capacity for anticipated future market demand, it delayed or cancelled projects, including slowing construction there.
Industry projections still point to a more widely distributed industry by the early 2030s. The SIA-BCG report expects leading-edge capacity to spread beyond Taiwan and South Korea to the United States, Europe, and Japan, and projects that the US, which produced no advanced logic chips in 2022, will make nearly 30% of logic chips at processes newer than 10 nanometers by 2032. That is a forecast from an industry group, made in 2024, before several of the schedule changes described here.
The map of chipmaking is being redrawn. In Magupon's view, the redrawing is best measured in fabs that ship wafers, not in announcements, and two of the funded US fabs described here now have opening dates in 2030.
Sources
- Public Law 117-167, Division A: CHIPS Act of 2022 (H.R. 4346, approved August 9, 2022)U.S. Government Publishing Office, August 9, 2022 · Primary source
- Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities Funded by the CHIPS Act: Project Status and Considerations for Congress (R49031)Congressional Research Service, July 14, 2026 · Secondary source
- Semiconductors: Commerce Needs Plan to Meet CHIPS for America R&D Requirements (GAO-26-109121)U.S. Government Accountability Office, August 6, 2026 · Primary source
- Emerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainSemiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, May 8, 2024 · Secondary source
- Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited, Annual Report on Form 20-F for fiscal year 2025U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), April 16, 2026 · Primary source
- Intel Corporation, Annual Report on Form 10-K for fiscal year 2025U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR), January 23, 2026 · Primary source
- European Chips ActEuropean Commission, Shaping Europe's digital future · Primary source
- Microchips: EU off the pace in a global race (press release on Special report 12/2025, The EU's strategy for microchips)European Court of Auditors, April 28, 2025 · Primary source
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